How does the initial committee affect the security of Blockchain in the protest protocols
Links table
Abstract and 1. Introduction
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Main concepts
2.1 Record attached only and 2.2 cases of the virtual device
2.3 Transactions as curry functions
2.4 The natural names of the state
2.5 Earth’s truth
2.6 Effective state representations
2.7 checkpoints
2.8 Implementation parameters: Calldata
2.9 arrangement implementation
2.10 Decision on the right situation
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Ideal layer design 2
3.1 VM job queue and arrangement of final transactions
3.2 Provides data and collecting garbage
3.3 state final
3.4 checkpoints
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Conclusion and references
A. Security teachers to reveal the contradiction
Security parameters discover the contradiction
The main safety parameter of the rapid contradiction approach is the size of the basic committee used for the DD protocol. The size of the slow -track backup committee depends on the chosen DR protocol, but it can be generously chosen, as the DR protocol should be used irregularly. Any protocol can be used to verify the current state, for example, consensus on the basis of majority voting, 2/3 of great importance, etc.
For the DD initial committee, safety assumptions are that the errors are independent, for example, due to confirmation errors, employee security, bribery, etc.; This is the most part of the participants available defective. We will use a random choice to choose a sub -group of participants available to serve in the Primary Committee. Because we are looking for any variation in the case of the reported output, this is no Weights voting scheme.
Leave R. It indicates the total number of participants available, and for It indicates the number of wrong or Byzantine participants.[6] We need to choose CThe size of the initial committee.
Our goal is to make the possibility that the entire initial committee is neglecting. The acceptable level will be small enough so that the expected number of the committee formations required in front of the All-FAULting Committee is enormous, so that this is even with large rates in the field of the committee, you must pass many age before this event occurs.
Since DR SCLEES cannot work unless there was at least an honest majority, we will use for ≈ R. /2 As the worst parameters, for example, R. = 100 and for = 49. The size of a committee C = 25, this is expected W = 3.837 · 109 committee choices. Assuming the Committee’s 1,000 -hour selection rate, this works up to about 437 years before facing a whole committee. This descends quickly: in C = 26, works about 1, 368 years old; in C = 30, is about 177, 740 years. It is clear if we have to assume for ≈ T /3, the initial committee can be smaller for the same level of safety.
An interesting note is that DD can work with a group of less worthy participants than it was possible with other protocols, that is, when the honest nodes are not a majority, as long as the DR group group is acceptable (for example, the majority is honest when DR uses an honest majority). It is clear that estimating whether the participants are difficult, and it is not clear why we may have to work with a group of participants in the wrong majority, although the probability is interesting. The possibility is to request periodic external security audits to participate in the DR group, and it has less rigorous requirements to participate in the DD group.
Authors:
(1) Bennett Yi, Oasis Laboratory;
(2) Al -Fajr song, Oasis Laboratory;
(3) Patrick McCuri, Ingoura;
(4) Chris Backland, Ingoura.
[6] If we want to use the tape model, instead of B, we will use B + R as the worst case to assume that all rational participants can be bribed and so on, thanks to the arbitrary transitions/transmission.
